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Abstract
This work proposes a new distributed and self-organized authentica-
tion scheme for Mobile Ad-hoc NETworks (MANETs). Apart from de-
scribing all its components, special emphasis is placed on proving that the
proposal fulfils most requirements derived from the special characteristics
of MANETs, including limited physical protection of broadcast medium,
frequent route changes caused by mobility, and lack of structured hierar-
chy. Interesting conclusions are obtained from an analysis of simulation
experiments in different scenarios.
Keywords: Authentication, Access Control, Mobile Ad-hoc Networks,
Cryptography
1 Introduction
Services such as authentication, confidentiality, integrity, non-repudiation, avail-
ability and access control are the main base for network security. Among all
these facilities, authentication, which ensures the true identities of nodes, is
the most fundamental one because other services depend fully on the correct
authentication of communication entities.
Mobile Ad-hoc NETworks (MANETs) may be described as autonomous net-
works formed by mobile nodes that are free to move at will. These networks
have received increasing interest in the last years, partly owing to their potential
applicability to many different situations, ranging from small, static networks
that are constrained by power sources, to large-scale, mobile and highly dy-
namic networks. Whilst conventional wired networks normally use a globally
trusted Certificate Authority (CA) for solving the authentication problem, such
a solution is not the best for MANETs. In fact, the authentication problem
in MANETs is much more difficult to solve due to their characteristics such as
the absence of a fixed infrastructure and centralized management, the dynamic
nature and limited wireless range of nodes, the dynamic topology, frequent link
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failures and possible transmission errors [1] [24]. Also, since all nodes must
collaborate to forward data, the wireless channel is prone to active and passive
attacks by malicious nodes, such as Denial of Service (DoS), eavesdropping,
spoofing, etc.
This work proposes a new distributed and self-organized authentication
scheme for MANETs, which fulfils most requirements of this type of networks,
including limited physical security, high node mobility and lack of infrastructure.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 some existing solutions are
briefly described. Section 3 provides an overview of the proposed scheme, in-
cluding general aspects and notation. Specific details about the five principal
elements of the architecture, i.e. network initialization, node insertion, access
control, proofs of life and node deletion are gathered in Section 4. The as-
sumptions required by the proposed scheme and an analysis of its security are
commented in Section 5. Section 6 provides a performance analysis developed
under NS-2. Finally, some conclusions and open questions complete the paper.
2 Related Work
In 1999 Zhou and Haas [27] suggested using threshold cryptography to secure
MANETs. They proposed a distributed CA to issue certificates, but this idea is
not applicable to ad-hoc groups since only selected nodes can serve as part of the
certification authority, and contacting the distributed CA nodes in a MANET
may be difficult. Luo et al. considered the same problem in [19] and Kong et
al. in [16]. They proposed a set of protocols for ubiquitous and robust access
control in MANETs, which allow every member to participate in access control
decisions. Unfortunately, this scheme has been shown to be insecure in [14].
Another interesting identification paradigm that has been used in wireless
ad-hoc networks is the notion of chain of trust [13], but it fails if malicious nodes
are within the network. Another typical solution is location-limited authentica-
tion, which is based on the fact that most ad-hoc networks exist in small areas
and physical authentication may be carried out between nodes that are close
to each other. However, the location-limited authentication is not feasible for
large, group-based settings.
Later, Kim et al. [15] developed a group access control framework based on a
menu of cryptographic techniques, which included simple access control policies,
such as static ACLs (Access Control Lists), as well as admission based on the
decision of a fixed entity: external (e.g., a CA or a Trusted Third Party) or
internal (e.g., a group founder). The main drawback of such a proposal is that
those policies are inflexible and unsuitable for dynamic ad-hoc networks. For
instance, static ACLs enumerate all possible members and hence cannot support
truly dynamic membership, and admission decisions made by a Trusted Third
Party (TTP) or a group founder violate the peer nature of the underlying ad-hoc
group.
Other authentication protocols that have been recently proposed for ad-hoc
networks are the following. The work [11] based on the RSA signature conducts
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to the problem of public key certification. Another recent paper [21] provides a
solution that works well, but just for short-lived MANETs.
In conclusion, we may say that the design of new schemes that fulfil most
requirements for this type of networks continues being considered an open ques-
tion, and indeed is the main objective of this paper.
Here we propose a new architecture for authentication in ad-hoc networks
called Global Authentication Scheme for Mobile Ad-hoc Networks (GASMAN),
which is based on the established cryptographic paradigm of Zero-Knowledge
Proofs (ZKPs) [10]. Since the information sent while executing does not con-
vey any secret related to the authentication process, ZKPs provide an elegant
and fault-tolerant solution to node authentication in MANETs. As we will see
in this paper, when comparing the GASMAN with existing proposals, several
improvements are remarkable:
1. In the proposed scheme all nodes play exactly the same role. In particular,
there are no selected nodes serving as CA and admission decisions are not
made by a TTP or a group founder but by the nodes themselves.
2. The GASMAN has scalability and flexibility and is suitable for dynamic
ad-hoc networks, thanks in part to that it is not based on any static
structure such as ACLs.
3. The proposal is feasible for group-based and long-lived MANETs. A key
factor to achieve it is the fact that it is not based on location-limited
authentication.
4. Availability is guaranteed through insertion, deletion and access control
procedures.
5. Our architecture assures strong authentication to any legitimate node will-
ing to join the network by using the ZKP implemented in the access con-
trol.
6. The GASMAN algorithms jointly with mobility help to reduce the time
necessary for nodes to join and access the network in a timely manner.
Summing up, the main features of the proposal are the adaptation to the
varying topology of the network, the open availability of broadcast transmissions
and the strong access control.
Up to now, very few publications have mentioned the proposal of authen-
tication systems for ad-hoc networks using ZKPs. Two of them are [2] and
[25], but none dealt with the related problem of topology changes in the net-
work. Another recent ZKP-based proposal for MANETs related with the one
proposed here was the hierarchical scheme described in [6], where two different
security levels were defined through the use of a hard-on-average graph problem,
but again no topology changes were considered. On the other hand, two works
that may be considered the seed of this work are [3] and [4]. The main differ-
ences between the proposal of this paper and both references are the following:
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definition of node life-cycle, analysis of possible attacks, description of neces-
sary assumptions, provision of a larger example, more data about performance
analysis, and a comparison with existent solutions.
3 Basics and Notation
With the term authentication, here we refer to verification of users’ identities.
Another important concept in this paper is availability, which involves making
network services or resources available to legitimate users in such a way that
the survivability of the network is ensured despite malicious incidences. The
architecture proposed in this paper is intended both for authentication and for
availability.
In particular, the protocol was designed as a strong authentication scheme
for group membership since when a node wants to be part of the network, it has
to be previously authorized by a legitimate node through a validation process
of its identity against previously stored information by using cryptographic cre-
dentials. According to [20], in any group member authentication protocol it is
necessary to provide robust methods to insert and to delete nodes, as well as to
allow the access only for legitimate members of the group. For that reason, not
only the ZKP used for access control is described, but also the update proce-
dures associated to insertions and deletions are carefully defined. For instance,
the procedure to delete nodes is only initiated once a node has been discon-
nected of the network for too long. The period of time after which the node is
deleted is an important parameter (T ) of the system here presented.
Note that in this paper strong authentication does not refer to multi-factor
authentication [9] since we consider just one factor for the authentication pro-
cess. Consequently, the proposal could be improved by adding more factors to
the authentication process, but even in such a case the strength of the scheme
would be always bound to the secrecy under which the factors are kept.
The access control described below is based on the general scheme of Zero-
Knowledge Proof introduced in [5], when using the Hamiltonian Cycle Problem
(HCP). A Hamiltonian cycle in a graph is a cycle that visits each vertex exactly
once and returns to the starting vertex. Determining whether such cycles exist
in a graph defines the Hamiltonian Cycle Problem, which is NP-complete. Such
a problem was chosen for our design mainly due to the low cost of the operations
associated to the update of a solution. This is an important characteristic since
in a highly dynamic setting such as MANETs these operations will be developed
frequently. Anyway, there should be pointed out that similar schemes based on
different NP-complete graph problems might be described. The only feature
demanded to the chosen problems is that the solutions may be easily updated
when small changes occur in the network. This is just the case of the Vertex
Cover, Independent Set or Clique Problems, for instance.
One of the key points to assure the correct operation of GASMAN is the use
of a chat application through broadcast that makes it possible for legitimate
on-line nodes to send a message to all on-line users. Such an application al-
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lows publishing all the information associated to the update of the network. In
order to provide integrity of chat information, the sender could sign a hash of
the chat message, and even such a hash could be encrypted using a symmetric
cipher with the shared secret key. On the other hand, although secrecy is not
necessary for chat messages because they are useless for illegitimate nodes, it
is required that only the on-line legitimate nodes can execute the chat applica-
tion. Consequently, prior authentication of the users of the chat application is
required. To solve this matter, the access control based on ZKP described in
Section IV.C could be used.
The information received through the chat application during an interval of
time must be stored by each on-line node in a FIFO queue. Such data should
be stored by each on-line node, allowing in this way the updating of the authen-
tication information not only to it but also to all the off-line legitimate nodes
whose access will be granted. Such a period is an essential parameter in the
system because it states both the maximum off-line time allowed for any legiti-
mate node, and the frequency of broadcasting the proofs of life. Consequently,
such a parameter should be previously agreed among all the legitimate nodes of
the network.
A generic life-cycle of a MANET has three major phases that are described
below (see Figure 1):
Initialization:
Each initial member of the original network will be securely provided,
either off-line or on-line, with a secret piece of information. The knowledge
of the secret network key will be used during access control in order to
prove the node’s eligibility for accessing to the protected resources or to
offer service to the network. After completing this stage, the legitimate
nodes are ready to actively participate in the network.
Access Control :
The access control process allows a legitimate node to prove its network
membership to an on-line node. These legitimate nodes must demonstrate
knowledge of the secret network key by using a challenge-response scheme.
On-line Session:
Once the legitimate node reaches an on-line state in the network, it gets
full access to protected resources such as the chat application. At the
same time, it may offer services such as the insertion of new nodes. There
should be taken into account that the secret network key will be updated
according to the network evolution. Hence, if a node is off-line for too
long, its secret key will expire. In such a case, the legitimate node would
have to be re-inserted by an on-line legitimate node.
Since in our proposal the secrecy of the network key is provided by the diffi-
culty of the HCP, the number of on-line legitimate nodes is a crucial parameter.
In consequence, as soon as the number of on-line legitimate nodes becomes
too small (when comparing it with certain threshold parameter), the network
termination is carried out and therefore, the life-cycle of the network ends.
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Figure 1: Node Life-Cycle
A remarkable aspect of our proposal, which is shared with other previous
proposals, is that no meaningful information may be stolen even if an adversary
is able to read the whole information published through the chat application,
or even if it eavesdrops the information exchanged between a legitimate prover
and a legitimate verifier at the time of executing the access control protocol.
In the following, the basic notation used throughout the proposal is ex-
plained.
• Gt = (Vt, Et) denotes the undirected graph used at stage t of the network
life-cycle.
• vi ∈ Vt represents both a vertex of the graph and a legitimate node.
• n = |Vt| is the order of Gt, which coincides with the number of legitimate
nodes.
• NGt(vi) denotes the neighbours of node vi in the graph Gt.
• Π(Vt) represents a random permutation over the vertex set Vt
• Π(Gt) denotes the graph isomorphic to Gt built after applying permuta-
tion Π(Vt).
• c ∈r C indicates that an element c is chosen at random with uniform
distribution from a set C.
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• HCt designates the Hamiltonian cycle used at stage t.
• Π(HCt) represents the Hamiltonian cycle HCt in the graph Π(Gt).
• NHCt(vi) denotes the neighbours of node vi in the Hamiltonian cycle HCt.
• S and A stand for the supplicant and the authenticator, respectively. This
notation is used both while an insertion phase and while the execution of
a ZKP-based access control are carried out.
• S 
 A symbolizes when node S contacts A.
• A↔ S : information means that A and S agree on information
• A s→ S : information means that A sends information to S through a
secure channel.
• A o→ S : information means that A sends information to S through an
open channel.
• A b→ network : information represents when A broadcasts information
to all on-line legitimate nodes.
• A b↔ network : information represents a two-step procedure where A
broadcasts information to all on-line legitimate nodes of the network,
and receives their answers.
• h stands for a public hash function.
• T denotes the threshold period that a legitimate nodes may be off-line
without beingn excluded of the network.
4 GASMAN description
This section contains the description of the procedures that form part of the
GASMAN architecture, including all the specific details about network initial-
ization, node insertion, access control, proofs of life and node deletion.
4.1 Network Initialization
The proposed protocol requires the definition of an initialization phase where
the secret information associated to the process of identification is generated
and distributed within the initial network. This initialization phase consists in
the definition of the graph used for the development of the protocol. Such a
graph should be generated with the participation of all the original members of
the network. Furthermore, the initialization phase also implies the distributed
generation by the initial legitimate members of the network of a hard instance
of the HCP in such a graph, task that was analysed in [17].
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In our proposal, as in trust graphs, the vertex set corresponds to the set
of nodes in the actual network during its whole life-cycle. Consequently, the
initialization process starts from a set V0 of n vertexes corresponding to the
nodes of the initial network. Hence, each vertex sub-index may be used as ID
(IDentification) for the corresponding node. The first step of the initialization
process consists of generating cooperatively and secretly a random permutation
Π of such a set. Once this generation is completed, each legitimate node should
know a Hamiltonian cycle HC0 corresponding exactly to such a permutation.
Finally, the partial graph formed by the edges corresponding to such a Hamil-
tonian cycle HC0, is completed by adding n groups of
2m
n edges, producing the
initial edge set E0. Here, m stands for the number of edges that the initial graph
will have after the initialization stage. Each one of these n groups of edges will
be generated by vi, i = 1, 2, ..., n according to the following restrictions: they
must have vi as one of its vertexes, while the other one will be randomly gener-
ated. Note that the size 2mn of those edge subsets must be large enough so that
the size of the resulting edge set |E0| = m guarantees the difficulty of the HCP
in the graph G0.
In general, finding Hamilton cycles is a difficult task even in relatively small
graphs [23], [22]. However, since in our proposal it is necessary to guarantee the
difficulty of the generated instance, we could use sparse pseudo-random regular
graphs based on a generalization of knight’s tours [18]. After the individual pro-
cesses described in the previous paragraph, in order to generate cooperatively
and secretly such a graph, the authenticated Diffie Hellmann key exchange pro-
tocols could be used [7].
Initialization Algorithm
Input: V0, with |V0| = n.
1. The n nodes of the network generate cooperatively, secretly and randomly
the cycle HC0 = Π (V0).
2. ∀vi ∈ V0, vi builds the set
NG0(i) = {{vj ∈r V0} ∪NHC0(i)}
with |NG0(i)| = 2mn .
3. ∀vi ∈ V0 : vi b→ network : NG0(i).
4. ∀vi ∈ V0 : vi merges:
E0 =
⋃
i=1,2,...,n
{(vi, vj) : vj ∈ NG0(i)} .
Output: G0 = (V0, E0), with |E0| = m.
Once the creation of the initial instance of the problem has been carried out
through the contribution of all the nodes of the network, each node will know a
Hamiltonian cycle in the resulting 2mn -regular graph. From then on, each time
a new user S wants to become a member of the network, it has to contact a
legitimate member A in order to follow the insertion procedure explained in the
following section.
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4.2 Node Insertion
Let us suppose that we are at stage t of the network life-cycle when a user S
contacts a legitimate member A of the network to become a member of the net-
work. Once S has convinced A to accept its membership in, the first step that
A should carry out is to assign S the lowest vertex number vi not assigned so
far in the vertex set Vt. Afterwards, A should broadcast such an assignment to
all on-line legitimate nodes in order to prevent another simultaneous insertion
with the same identifier. If A receives less than n/2 answers to the previous
message, she stops the insertion procedure because the number of nodes that
are aware of the insertion is not large enough. Otherwise, A develops the cor-
responding update of the secret Hamiltonian cycle HCt by selecting at random
two neighbour vertexes vj and vk in order to insert the new node vi between
them. Additionally, A chooses at random a subset of 2mn − 2 nodes in Vt such
that none of them is its neighbour in HCt. Finally, A broadcasts the set of
neighbours NGt+1(vi) of S in the new graph Gt+1 .
Each time a node receives a graph update, it should secretly modify the
corresponding Hamiltonian cycle. In order to achieve it, it uses the information
provided to identify the unique position (according to the new edge set Et+1)
in the cycle where the new node can be inserted. In this way, it will be able to
easily update the secret network key by simply inserting the vertex vi between
the vertexes vj and vk. At the same time, the authenticator node A must send
the supplicant node S both the graph Gt+1 (deploying an open channel), and
the Hamiltonian cycle HCt+1 (through a secure channel).
Insertion Algorithm
Input: At stage t a supplicant node S wants to become a member of the
network.
1. S 
 A.
2. Node S convinces node A to accept its membership in the network.
3. A assigns S the identifier vi such that i = min{l : vl 6∈ Vt}
4. A
b↔ network : vi
4.1 If A receives less than n/2 answers, she stops the insertion procedure.
4.2 Otherwise:
4.2.1 A chooses:
(vj , vk) : vj ∈r Vt, vk ∈r NCHt(vj)
4.2.2 A chooses at random:
NGt+1(vi) = {vj , vk} ∪ {w1, w2, ..., w 2mn −2}
such that NGt+1(vi) ⊆ Vt ∧ ∀wl1 , wl2 : wl1 6∈ NCHt(wl2)}
4.2.3 A
b→ network : NGt+1(vi)
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4.2.4 Each on-line node updates Gt by defining Vt+1 = Vt ∪ {vi},
Et+1 = Et∪NGt+1(vi) and HCt+1 = HCt\{(vj , vk)}∪{(vj , vi)∪
(vi, vk)}
4.2.5 A
o→ vi : Gt+1
4.2.6 A
s→ vi : HCt+1
Output: The supplicant node S becomes a legitimate member of the net-
work.
4.3 Access Control
If a legitimate node S has been off-line or out-of-coverage from stage t and
wants to re-enter into the network at stage r, its first step should be to contact
a legitimate on-line member A. Afterwards, A should check whether the period
S has been off-line is not greater than T . In this case, S has to be authenticated
by A through a ZKP based on its knowledge of the secret solution HCt on the
graph Gt.
The aforementioned ZKP begins with the agreement between A and S on
the number of iterations l to execute. From there on, in each iteration, S will
choose a random permutation Πj(Vt) on the vertex set that will be used to
build a graph Π(Gt) isomorphic to Gt. The hash value of both the permutation
h(Πj(Vt)) and the Hamiltonian cycle in the graph h(Πj(HCt)) are then sent
to A. When this information is received by A, it chooses a bit bj at random
(bj ∈r {0, 1}). Depending on the selected value, S will provide A with the
image of the Hamiltonian cycle through the isomorphism, or with the specific
definition of the isomorphism. In the verification phase, A will check that the
received information was correctly built.
Once the authentication of supplicant S has been successfully carried out,
the authenticator A gives him the necessary information to have full access to
the protected resources such as the chat application, for example.
Access Control Algorithm
Input: At stage r a supplicant node S that has been off-line since stage t
wants to re-enter into the network.
1. S 
 A
2. S
o→ A : Gt
3. A checks whether r − t ≤ T
4. if r − t > T then S is not authenticated
5. otherwise:
• A↔ S : l
• for j = 1, 2, · · · , l
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5.1 S chooses Πj(Vt) and builds Πj(Gt) and Πj(HCt), the graph
isomorphic to Gt and the corresponding Hamiltonian cycle, re-
spectively.
5.2 S
o→ A : {h(Πj(Vt)), h(Πj(HCt))}
5.3 A chooses the challenge bj ∈r {0, 1}
5.4 A
o→ S : bj
5.4.1 If bj = 0 then S
o→ A : {Πj(Gt),Πj(HCt)}
5.4.2 If bj = 1 then S
o→ A : Πj
5.5 A verifies that
i. Πj(HCt)) is a valid Hamiltonian cycle in Πj(Gt), if bj = 0
ii. the hash function h applied on Πj(Gt) coincides with h(Πj(Gt)),
if bj = 1
• if ∃j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , l} such that the verification is negative, then S is
isolated.
• otherwise A s→ S : the necessary information to have full access to
protected resources of the network.
Output: Node S is connected on-line to the network.
4.4 Proofs of Life
All on-line legitimate nodes have to confirm their presence in an active way. Such
a confirmation is carried out every period of time T . It consists in broadcasting
a message (proof-of-life) to all on-line legitimate nodes.
If some insertion happens during such a period, a proof of life of every on-line
legitimate node will be distributed together with the information necessary for
the insertion procedure. Otherwise, only the proof of life is required. During
such a broadcast every node adds its own proof of life to the broadcast. In
this way, when the broadcast reaches the last node, a broadcast back starts
containing the proofs of life of all on-line legitimate nodes.
Proof-of-Life Algorithm
Input: At stage t node A is an on-line legitimate node of the network.
1. A initializes its clock = 0 just after its last proof of life.
2. if clock > T then
2.1 A
b↔ network : A′s proof of life
2.1.1 If A receives less than n/2 proofs of life as answers to her broad-
cast, she stops her proof of life and puts back her clock.
2.1.2 Otherwise: A
b→ network : Received proofs of life
Output: At stage t+ 1 node A continues being an on-line legitimate node
of the network of the network.
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Note that the possibility that a legitimate, but malicious, node can broadcast
a fake proof of life for other nodes exists. However, the potential impact of this
threat may be considered low since it would imply just the possible life extension
of some off-line nodes.
4.5 Node Deletion
The deletion procedure is mainly based on the confirmation of the active pres-
ence of on-line legitimate nodes through their proofs of life. Each node should
update its stored graph by deleting all those nodes that have not sent any proof
of life after a period T . This fact implies that each node that has not proven
its presence will be deleted from the network, as well as from the Hamiltonian
cycle.
Node deletions are explicitly communicated to all on-line legitimate nodes
in the second step of broadcasts of proofs of life. This way to proceed allows
any node that is off-line in that moment will be able to update its stored graph
as soon as it gets access to the network.
Deletion Algorithm
Input: At stage t, a node vi is an off-line legitimate node of the network.
1. A initializes her clock = 0.
2. if clock > T then
2.1 ∀vi ∈ Vt: A checks vi’s proof of life in A’s FIFO queue.
2.2 A updates Vt+1 = Vt \ {vi ∈ Vt with no proof }.
2.3 A updates Et+1 = Et \ {(vi, vj) : vi ∈ Vt with no proof, vj ∈
NGt(vi)} ∪ {(vj , vk) : vj , vk ∈ NHCt(vi)}.
2.4 A updates HCt+1 = HCt \ {(vj , vi), (vi, vk)} ∪ (vj , vk) : vi ∈ Vt with
no proof, vj , vk ∈ NHCt(vi)
3. If A started the broadcast used for the vi’s deletion, A adds this informa-
tion to the second step of the proof-of-life broadcast: A
b→ network : vi is
deleted.
Output: At stage t+1 the node vi has been deleted both from the network
and from the graph.
This procedure guarantees a limited growth of the graph that is used in
authentication, and at the same time, allows that always the legitimate nodes
set corresponds exactly to the vertexes in that graph. Apart from this, it is
remarkable the fact that thanks to this procedure the recovery of legitimate
members of the network that have been disconnected momentarily is possible.
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5 Assumptions and Security Analysis
Note that the whole proposal is based on a single and shared secret network
key and although the key is periodically updated, if a legitimate node is com-
promised and reveals the shared secret key, the whole network would be com-
promised [12], [8]. Consequently, this proposal initially assumes the ideal en-
vironment where all legitimate nodes are honest and where no adversary may
compromise a legitimate node of the network in order to read its secret stored
information. Such assumptions are well suited as a basic model in order to de-
cide under which circumstances the GASMAN is applicable to MANETs. For
instance, a possible adaptation of the proposal in order to avoid those hypothesis
could be defining a threshold scheme to be used in every step of the GASMAN,
so that every proof of life, insertion, access control or deletion operation should
be done by a coalition of on-line nodes. Then, a dishonest node would not affect
the correct operation of the network.
It is clear that the proposal inherits some problems of the distributed trust
model such as the important necessity that legitimate nodes cooperate. Conse-
quently, it is advisable to include a scheme to stimulate node cooperation.
Finally, another requirement of the GASMAN is the establishment of a se-
cure channel for the insertion procedure. However, that aspect may be easily
fulfilled thanks to the fact that most wireless devices are able to communicate
with each other via Bluetooth wireless technology or through other more secure
short range wireless methods.
With respect to possible attacks and due to the lack of a centralized struc-
ture, it is natural that possible DOS (Denial Of Service) attacks have as their
main objective the chat application. In order to protect the GASMAN against
this threat it must be assured that chat messages, although are publicly read-
able, may be only sent by legitimate on-line members of the network. Another
important aspect related to the use of the chat application is the necessary
synchronization among the on-line nodes. In order to achieve it, we could use
global time synchronization derived from the application of IEEE 802.11 Timer
Synchronization Function to MANETs [26].
MANETs are especially vulnerable to different threats such as identity theft
(spoofing) and the man-in-the-middle attack. Such attacks are difficult to pre-
vent in environments where membership and network structure are dynamic and
the presence of central directories cannot be assumed. However, our proposal is
resistant to spoofing attacks because access control is granted through a ZKP.
It implies that any information published through the chat application or sent
openly during the execution of access control mechanism becomes useless.
On the other hand, the goal of the man-in-the-middle attack is either to
change a sent message or to gain some useful information by one of the inter-
mediate nodes. Again, the use of ZKPs in our protocol implies that reading any
transferred information does not reveal any useful information about the secret,
so changing the message is not possible since only legitimate nodes whose access
has been allowed can use the chat application.
Another active attack that might be especially dangerous in MANETs is the
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so-called Sybil attack. It happens when a node tries to get and use multiple
identities. The most extreme case of this type of attacks is the establishment
of a false centralized authority who states the identities of legitimate members.
However, this specific attack is not possible against our scheme due to its dis-
tributed nature. In the GASMAN, the responsibility of controlling general Sybil
attacks will be shared among all the on-line nodes. If an authenticator node
detects that a supplicant node is trying to get access to the network by using
an ID that is yet being used on-line, such access control must be denied and the
corresponding node must be isolated. The same happens when any on-line node
detects that an authenticator node is trying to insert a new member into the
network with a new ID, and such a node has yet assigned as a vertex ID. Again,
such insertion must be denied and the corresponding supplicant node must be
isolated. Anyway, if a Sybil attacker enters the network, any of its neighbours
will detect it as soon as it sends proofs of life for different vertexes ID.
Finally, in the proposal, an eavesdropping node could observe all the ex-
changed messages and the zero-knowledge property guarantees that no impor-
tant information about the shared secret is revealed. With respect to a possible
play-back attack, by using the access control of our protocol, the on-line node A
always can choose any random challenge, and the supplicant node S has to com-
pute the correct response, which is later used by A to check if the authentication
is successful. Therefore, previously used challenges and answers are useless.
6 Performance Analysis
We now analyze the efficiency of the proposal both from the energy consump-
tion and from computational complexity points of view. We consider the energy
consumption which is the result of transmissions of data and processor activ-
ities due to authentication tasks. In the proposal there are two phases when
computational overhead is more significant: the ZKP-based access control and
the periodic checking of stored elements in the FIFO queue. A reduction on
the number of rounds of ZKP has a direct effect on the total exchanged mes-
sages size in insertions, but a trade-off should be maintained between protocols
robustness and performance. Indeed, regarding total data transmission over
wireless links, the ZKPs take less than 10% in a usual situation.
The dominant time-consuming jobs are the periodic proofs of life, which
accounts for around 90% of the total exchanged message size in many cases.
However, we found that these compulsory proofs of life imply an incentive tech-
nique for stimulating cooperation in authentication tasks. This is due to the
fact that nodes that are broadcasters of deletion queries or authenticators in
insertions or access controls are exempted from their obligation to broadcast
their proofs of life.
In order to reduce data communication cost, an increase on the threshold
period T might be an option, but again an acceptable balance should be kept
because T has implications also on storage requirements of the protocol. Accord-
ing to our experiments, T should depend directly on the number of legitimate
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Figure 2: Example of Final Associated Graph and Hamiltonian Cycle
and/or on-line nodes in order to prevent a possible bandwidth overhead in large
networks.
For the performance analysis of the proposal we used the Network Simulator
NS-2 with the DSR routing protocol. We created several Tcl based NS-2 scripts
in order to produce various output trace files that have been used both to do data
processing and to visualize the simulation. Within our simulation we used the
visualization tool of Network Animator NAM and the NS-2 trace files analyzer
of Tracegraph. For the simulation of mobility we used the Setdest program in
order to generate movement pattern files using the random Waypoint algorithm.
An excerpt of the trace files corresponding to the an example of simulation
is shown in Table 1. Basically, it consisted of generating a scenario file that
describes the movement pattern of the nodes and a communication file that
describes the traffic in the network. These files were used to produce trace files
that were analyzed to measure various parameters.
The trace files are used to visualize the simulation using NAM, while the
measurement values are used as data for plots with Tracegraph. The final graph
and Hamiltonian cycle associated to the example network is shown in Figure
2, where green is used to indicate the Hamiltonian cycle, blue is used for the
inserted nodes and red is used for the edges deleted from the Hamiltonian cycle
when inserting new nodes.
In order to study the effectiveness of the GASMAN, we studied it in a set
15
Time Event HC
0.1 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 are legitimate 8,3,9,7,4,2,6,5,1,10,0
1.2 Insertion of Node 14 is broadcast by Node 4 8,...,4,14,2,...,0
1.3 Nodes 3, 1, 0 do not answer to proof of life
3.2 Node 0 is re-inserted by ZKP with Node 8
8.6 Node 3 is re-inserted by ZKP with Node 4
9.4 Node 1 is re-inserted by ZKP with Node 10
11.6 Node 1 turns off
13.9 Proof of life started by Node 3
14.2 Nodes 1, 2 do not answer to proof of life
14.8 Node 2 is re-inserted by ZKP with Node 14
17.2 Proof of life started by Node 2
17.5 Nodes 1, 5 do not answer to proof of life
21.7 Node 5 turns off
31.4 Node 1 turns on and Node 2 is chosen for ZKP
31.5 Node 4 turns off
32.5 Proof of life started by Node 1
32.8 Nodes 4, 5, 6 do not answer to the proof of life
34.2 Node 6 is re-inserted by ZKP with Node 2
38.5 Proof of life started by Node 6
38.7 Nodes 4, 5 do not answer to proof of life
41.4 Node 1 turns off
53.2 Node 1 turns on and Node 0 is chosen for ZKP
59.6 Proof of life started by Node 6
59.9 Nodes 4, 5 do not answer to proof of life
64.2 Node 5 is deleted 8,...,6,1,10,0
64.7 Node 2 turns off
72.5 Node 4 turns on and Node 0 is chosen for ZKP
75.3 Insertion of Node 13 is broadcast by Node 14 8,...,2,13,6,1,10,0
75.4 Node 2 does not answer to proof of life
Table 1: Example of Trace
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of realistic scenarios. In particular, we used the most commonly used mobility
model by the research community, the so-called Random Waypoint Model, which
uses pause times and random changes in destination and speed.
An extensive number of simulations using NS-2 simulator with 802.11 MAC
and DSR routing protocols in order to see the effects of different metrics by
varying network density and topology were run. Within the simulations, rela-
tionships can be established anytime two nodes are located in close proximity
and the random walk mobility model was used with various pause time and
maximum speed. In particular, we varied the number of nodes from 15 to 100.
Also, our architecture was evaluated with 250 x 250, 500 x 500, and 750 x 750
m2 square area of ad-hoc network. In each case, the nodes move around with 0.5
second pause time and 20m/s maximum speeds. The transmission range of the
secure channel is 5 meters while that of the data channel is fixed to 250 meters.
The period of simulation varied from 60 to 200 seconds. We also changed the
probabilities of insertions and deletions in each second from 5% to 25%, in order
to modify the mobility rate and antenna range of nodes from 2 to 15 m/s and
100 to 250 meters respectively. This range also defines different frequencies of
accesses to the network.
The first conclusions we obtained from the simulations are:
• The protocol scales perfectly to any sort of networks with different levels
of topology changes.
• Node density is a key factor for the mean time of insertions, but such a
factor is not as big as it might be previously assumed since nodes do not
forward two packets of data corresponding to the same proof of life coming
from two different nodes.
• A right choice of parameter T should be done according to number of
nodes, bandwidth of wireless connections and computation and storing
capacities of nodes.
• A positive aspect of the proposal is that the requirements in the devices’
hardware are very low.
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7 Conclusions and Open Questions
Successful authentication in mobile ad-hoc networks is critical for assuring se-
cure and effective operation of the supported application. This work describes
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a new authentication scheme, the so-called GASMAN, which has been specially
designed for MANETs. Such a protocol supports knowledge-based member au-
thentication in server-less environments. The overall goal of the GASMAN has
been the design of a strong authentication scheme that is able to react and adapt
to network topology changes without the necessity of any centralized authority.
In order to avoid the transference of any relevant information, its core technique
consists of a Zero-Knowledge Proof. Furthermore, the proposal is balanced since
the procedures that the legitimate members of the network have to carry out
when the network is updated (insertion or deletion of nodes) imply identical
work for every legitimate member of the network.
The development of an initial simulation of the proposal through the NS-2
network simulator has been carried out. A statistical analysis of the proposal
and a comparison of simulation results with other approaches will be included
in a forthcoming version of this work. Finally, two important tasks included
among future works are the improvement of formal description and verification
of the proposal by using the BAN logic, and the implementation of the proposal
on real devices to get the realistic processing performance.
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